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ABSTRACT  
Taxes are the backbone of an economy, therefore, an effective tax system is 
very necessary for the survival of an economy. All the modern and developed 
economies have a higher rate of taxes as a percentage of GDP e.g. UK 33%, 
the USA 24.5%, Germany 38.8%, and France 45.4% (OECD, 2019). So, it 
is always important to measure the tax buoyancy among and within 
countries. This article has examined the buoyancy of taxes among the 
selected South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
countries from 1990 to 2019. Pooled regression has been applied for 
measuring the tax buoyancy coefficients for sales tax, income tax, customs 
duty, excise duty, and total tax revenue. The findings show that sales tax, 
income tax, and total tax revenue are significant with the buoyancy 
coefficient of 1.30, 1.12, and 1.01, respectively. Whereas the excise and 
customs, duties show a positive but insignificant buoyancy coefficient of 
0.81 and 0.62, respectively. Among all revenue generation taxes, income tax 
and sales tax are leading; this indicates that South Asian countries prefer a 
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progressive tax system. But the overall tax system in South Asia is inclined 
towards proportional response and needs strict checks for the improvement 
of the tax system. Finally, the revenue collection through taxation can be 
further enhanced with the help of an improved domestic tax system, as 
customs duties and excise duties are discouraged by the World Bank, IMF, 
and WTO.    
Keywords: tax buoyancy; income tax; customs duty; excise duty 
JEL Codes: H2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Higher and stable economic growth is the ultimate objective of all economies 
(Ali, 2015; Ali and Rehman, 2015). In the case of developing countries, 
inefficient resource mobilization and fiscal imbalance are the common 
factors to hinder higher and stable economic growth. Under such 
circumstances, developing countries used to rely on foreign aid and foreign 
debt, which was very famous during the 1970s and 1980s. But in this present 
era, foreign debt and foreign aid seem to have their own macroeconomic and 
inter-regional impacts. A country needs to meet its growing needs of finance 
while keeping fiscal imbalance stable either by reducing its expenditures or 
by more revenue collection (Hallerberg and Basinger, 1998). Previously, 
many developing countries used to reduce their development expenditures 
to a minimum level i.e. infrastructure, health, and education. But the 
reduction in development expenditures means low infrastructure and lower 
economic growth, so a country needs to manage its revenue mobilization and 
fiscal stability with feasible alternatives. The most important instrument 
through which the revenues are mobilized is the tax policy and structure of 
taxation (Bahl et al. 1984). The tax revenue collection is one of the most 
significant issues, as different countries have different taxation structures 
regardless of their economic conditions, but many countries have a similar 
structure for personal income taxes, sales taxes, customs duties, and excise 
duties (Baunsgaard and Keen, 2010). If the economy is working under a 
continuous fiscal deficit, the tax revenues fail to generate enough resources. 
Both the efficiency of the taxation system and stable economic growth 
become doubtful, which makes tax buoyancy and elasticity important tools 
to review the taxation system and fiscal policy. A buoyant and elastic 
taxation system implies that the tax revenue increases more proportionately 
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than an increase in the level of national income (Mansfield, 1972). Such a 
type of taxation system is desirable for developing economies to maintain 
the balance between revenues and expenditures to avoid fiscal imbalance 
(Indraratna, 2003). Thus, it is important to examine the tax elasticity to 
balance between tax revenues and government expenditures in the path of 
stable economic growth.  
The tax buoyancy and elasticity measure the responsiveness of tax receipt of 
the national income with the help of an effective system of taxation. A tax is 
considered buoyant when a change of one percent in national income 
generates more than one percent change in the tax receipt. While measuring 
the tax buoyancy, no control has been made to discretionary changes in the 
tax system or administration (Andre and Girouard, 2005). Consequently, tax 
buoyancy reflects both discretionary changes and automatic growth. The tax 
elasticity measures the responsiveness of tax receipt of the national income 
at ceteris paribus (Upender, 2008). A tax is considered to be elastic when a 
one percent change in the level of national income results in more than one 
percent change in the tax revenue after controlling exogenous factors, i.e. 
discretionary changes in the tax policy (Krushna, 2015).  
Tax buoyancy is considered more effective as compared to tax elasticity, as 
it is hard to get information regarding changes in tax policy, rates, bases, or 
regulations. This information belongs to the ministry of finance, but 
sometimes ministry does not report the information regarding the 
discretionary changes. Various studies examine the importance of tax 
buoyancy for different countries and regions i.e. Hamlet (1998) examines the 
relationship between GDP and tax buoyancy in the case of African countries. 
Some other studies examine the same type of relationship e.g. Ghura (1998) 
studies Sub-Saharan countries, Tanzi and Howell (2000) study East Asian 
countries, Andre and Girouard (2005) study the OECD nations, Belinga et 
al. (2014) study OECD nations, Bayu (2015) studies Ethiopia, Akram and 
Sahin (2015) study Turkey. But the tax buoyancy of South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries has been ignored by the 
researchers. This study aims to examine the effectiveness of the tax system 
in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Countries. 
Almost 2 billion people are residing in this part of the world. Being the 
emerging part of the world, SAARC has special importance in the world's 
socioeconomic and political sphere. Thus, the tax buoyancy of SAARC 
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nations needs special attention, this study has tried to fill the literature gap. 
The remaining paper is comprised of a literature review, the model, 
econometric methodology, empirical discussion conclusions and limitations 
of the study, and future directions.      
II. LITERATURE REVIEW         
All governments whether democratic or non-democratic impose taxes, to 
finance their development and non-development expenditures (Bahl et al., 
1984). To ensure a healthy and sound financial position, a proper check on 
the balance between expenditures and revenues must be done regularly. 
Revenue generation usually follows an income pattern and higher national 
income is attached to higher taxes, which may be proportional or non-
proportional. If the tax collection system is proportional, the taxation system 
is considered a good automatic stabilizer and a buoyant one. But, if the tax 
collection system is non-proportional, then the taxation system is considered 
as non-buoyant or not a good automatic economic stabilizer. Several studies 
examined the taxation system of developing and developed countries. In this 
section, the most relevant studies have been selected as a literature review.  
Ahmed (1994) estimates the determinants of tax buoyancy in the case of 35 
developing countries for 10 years by using the OLS method. The study 
reveals that growth in imports, as in the industrial sector and money supply 
has a positive impact on growth in taxes while the services sector and 
agriculture sector hurt growth in taxes. Ghura (1998) analyzes the changes 
in tax revenue to GDP ratio in the case of 39 sub-Saharan countries from 
1985 to 1996. This study mainly focuses on economic policies and 
corruption in tax revenues. The results show that the tax revenue to GDP 
ratio increases with income, trade openness and decreases with the share of 
the agriculture sector. The expansionary fiscal policy and the corruption 
cause a reduction in the ratio of tax revenue to GDP. Moreover, structural 
reforms play a significant role in enhancing the tax ratio. The public services 
provided by the government affect the tax ratio to GDP positively while the 
external grants affect it negatively.  
Mukarram (2001) examines the government revenue creation in Pakistan 
after different tax reforms from 1980 to 2001. The study concludes that the 
elasticity and buoyancy of direct taxes to be 1.13 and 1.61 respectively. It 
shows that an increase in income generates a more proportional change in 
tax revenues. The custom duties have elasticity and buoyancy coefficients 
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0.32 and 0.55 respectively, which shows that the change in revenues 
proportion was much lower than the change in income. For excise duties the 
coefficients are 0.47 and 0.76, this indicates a slow growth in revenue 
through excise duties. For sales tax, the elasticity and buoyancy are 1.0 and 
1.51 respectively, which reveals that revenue generation is proportional to 
tax elasticity coefficients however, by tax buoyancy it shows to be more than 
proportional. Indraratna (2003) explores the short-run and long-run elasticity 
of taxes in the case of Sri Lanka from 1960 to 1994. Pre-reform and post-
reform periods have been used for reviewing the income tax, turnover tax, 
excise tax, import tax, and total taxes. The results of the study show that the 
elasticity of most of the taxes is below unity; this means that the tax system 
is inelastic during the study period. Income tax seems to have modest 
elasticity i.e. 0.70, whereas the excise tax seems to have low elasticity i.e. 
0.20. Turnover taxes had relatively high elasticity i.e. 0.80 during the studied 
period. The study recommends that tax buoyancy is the best option for better 
comparison, but it is neglected in the case of Sir Lanka.  
Bilquess (2004) estimates the elasticity and buoyancy of the tax system in 
the case of Pakistan from 1974 to 2002. The divisia index method has been 
used for this purpose. The study shows that sales tax is the main source of 
revenue generation in Pakistan, which is accounted for 64% of the total 
indirect taxes, and excise duties have accounted for 18% of revenue 
generated by indirect taxes. Whereas the share of income tax indirect taxes 
is inclusive of withholding tax which amounts to 70% and otherwise it is 
very low. The study shows that tax policy changes did not affect the revenue 
generation of Pakistan during the selected period.  
Abhijit (2007) has investigated the main sources of resource mobilization for 
105 developing countries for 25 years. The study uses structural variables 
(per capita GDP, the share of agriculture in GDP, the ratio of imports to 
GDP, share of aid and debt in GDP) and institutional variables (corruption, 
law and order, government stability, political stability, and economic 
stability) as the source of resource mobilization. The study finds that 
agricultural share harms tax revenue performance. Moreover, openness and 
revenue performance seem to be positively related. Foreign aid has positive 
impacts whereas foreign debt harms revenue performance in the case of 
selected developing countries. Timsina (2007) examines the buoyancy and 
elasticity of the tax system in the case of Nepal from 1975 to 2005. The study 
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finds that a major part of revenue collection is not from the automatic 
responses but discretionary changes. The study concludes that the overall tax 
system of Nepal is inelastic but relatively buoyant for the period under study. 
Upender (2008) estimates the tax buoyancies in the case of India for post-
tax reforms of 1992 and compared them to the pre-tax reform period from 
1950 to 2005. The study uses the double log model and interaction variables 
to capture the combined effect of changes in revenue and tax policy. The 
results show that constant gross taxes are more than unity during the pre-tax 
reform period and this means that gross taxes are relatively elastic. Whereas 
the estimates show that gross tax revenue is less than unity in the post-tax 
reform period which means that the gross tax was relatively inelastic. 
Wolswijk (2009) explores the short-run and long-run tax elasticity in the case 
of the Netherland from 1971 to 2005. The study uses the error correction 
model and DOLS to examine the short-run as well as long-run tax elasticity. 
When revenues are below the equilibrium, the long-run elasticity of VAT is 
0.92 whereas, in the short-run, it is 0.64. On the other hand, when revenues 
are above the equilibrium the elasticity is 1.10. The overall long-run 
elasticity for PIT to wages is 1.57 and in the short-run, it is 5.1 besides, no 
asymmetry has been observed.  
Chaudhry and Munir (2010) estimate the determinants of tax revenue in the 
case of Pakistan for the period of 1973 to 2009. The study uses an 
autoregressive model (dynamic model) to capture the dynamic effects on the 
tax revenues in Pakistan. The results of the study show that the services 
sector and the agriculture sector harm tax to GDP ratio, whereas openness, 
broad money, foreign aid, external debt, and political stability have a positive 
impact on tax revenue. Twerefou et al., (2010) estimate the buoyancy and 
elasticity of the tax system in Ghana for the period of 1970 to 2007. The 
results show that the overall tax system is buoyant as well as income elastic 
in the long run, whereas it is less buoyant and inelastic in the short run. The 
overall tax elasticity is greater than unity, this shows that an increase in 
income is proportional to tax revenue.  
Addison and Levin (2011) analyze the determinants of overall tax revenue 
and tax structure of 39 countries from 1980 to 2005. For the empirical 
analysis, two-step GMM regression has been used. The results of the study 
show that the agriculture sector affects the total tax revenue-GDP ratio 
adversely and openness and peacetime affect it positively. Per capita GDP 
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and urbanization are positively related to the total tax revenue-to-GDP ratio 
in the case of indirect tax revenue whereas, the size of foreign aid affects the 
direct tax-GDP ratio adversely. Milwood (2011) estimates the extent to 
which the discretionary changes affect the elasticity and buoyancy in the 
Jamaican tax system from March 1998 to December 2010. The results of the 
study show that overall tax growth is 3.39 of which 1.20 is due to 
discretionary measures and 2.19 is automatic growth. Okech and Mburu 
(2011) estimate the tax elasticity and buoyancy of the tax system of Kenya 
from 1986 to 2009. The results of the study show that the overall tax system 
is less buoyant. The income tax and excise duty are nominal buoyant and 
their elasticity is less than unity. The sales tax is also less buoyant but the 
import duties are highly buoyant. The major tax components are found to be 
inelastic with elasticity less than unity except for excise duty and VAT.  
Kargbo and Egwaikhide (2012) evaluate the performance of the overall tax 
system in Sierra Leone from 1977 to 2009. The study finds that buoyancy 
estimates are higher than elasticity estimates and the discretionary measures 
to create more tax revenue for Sierra Leone during the study period. The 
study also finds that short-run elasticity is lower than the long-run elasticity 
and the tax system of Sierra Leone is inelastic during the studied period. 
Samwel and Isaac (2012) estimate the tax elasticity and tax buoyancy and 
different components of tax revenue in Kenya from 1986 to 2010. The results 
show that elasticity and buoyancy for whole taxes in growth in GDP to be 
proportionally higher than in tax revenues. Moreover, the buoyancy for 
excise duties, import duties, and income terms are more than unity. The 
findings suggest that the overall tax system of Kenya is neither buoyant nor 
elastic during the studied period. 
Hamlet (2013) estimates the buoyancy as well as elasticity of different taxes 
for the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) especially, for Dominic, 
St. Lucia, Antigua, and Barbuda from 1980 to 2010. The results show that 
the total tax for Dominica and St. Lucia grew at the rate of 0.99 to 1.04, 
respectively, whereas for Antigua and Barbuda the rate is 1.07. The study 
concludes that the taxes for Dominica, St. Lucia, Antigua, and Barbuda are 
buoyant after the tax reforms. Karagoz (2013) finds the determinants of tax 
buoyancy in Turkey by using the time series data from 1970 to 2010. The 
study shows that revenues in Turkey to be significantly affected by 
agricultural and industrial sector shares in GDP, foreign debt stock, 
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monetization rates of the economy, and urbanization but the agricultural 
sector seems to harm GDP. The results suggest that the openness of trade has 
no significant impact on tax revenues in the Turkish economy.  
Belinga et al. (2014) estimate the long-run and short-run tax buoyancy for 
34 OCED countries from 1965 to 2012. The results show that the average 
long-run buoyancy is 1.06, and it is significantly smaller than unity in four 
countries. So, it is concluded that long-sun buoyancy for the countries is 
either closer to one or exceeds unity by a smaller degree. The study also 
suggests that short-term buoyancy has relatively more variations than long-
run buoyancy. Akram and Sahin (2015) analyze the buoyancy of the tax 
system in Turkey for the period of January 2005 to June 2014. The results 
show that the tax system is less buoyant during the study period in the short-
run, but in the long run, buoyancy estimates show that the tax system has a 
positive relationship with the income level of Turkey, this show that 
increases in GDP cause a direct increase in the tax revenue.  
Dudine and Jalles (2018) examine the long-run and short-run tax buoyancy 
in the case of 107 countries for 1980–2014. For empirical analysis fully 
modified ordinary least square has been used. The results show that in the 
case of developed countries, both long-run and short-run buoyancies are not 
different from 1, in the long run, tax buoyancy exceeds 1 in the case of 
corporate income tax. But in the case of emerging countries, personal income 
tax and social security contribute a major share in total revenues. In the case 
of developing countries taxes on goods and services play important role in 
revenue collection. In the complete sample case both trade openness and 
human capital increase buoyancy, while inflation and output volatility 
decrease it. 
Tanchev and Todorov (2019) examine the tax buoyancy in the case of 
Bulgaria from 1999 t0 2017. and their relationship with Bulgaria’s economic 
growth. The results show that the buoyancies of aggregate tax revenue, 
personal income tax, and social security contributions significantly differ 
from one another in the long run. The buoyancies of the value-added tax and 
the corporate tax are greater than one in the long run. In the short run, the 
buoyancy of the aggregate tax revenues, the corporate tax, the income tax, 
and the social security contributions are different from one. The short-run 
buoyancy of VAT exceeds one, hence the dynamics of VAT revenues are 
sustainable. The collectability of the aggregate tax revenue, personal income 
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tax, and social security contributions has increased neither in the long run 
nor in the short run. It is therefore recommended that inefficient taxes, whose 
collectability does not increase, be reformed. 
III. THE MODEL  
A government is unable to function without revenues because it has to make 
different expenditures i.e. expenditures on defense, health, education, 
infrastructure, transfer payments, and subsidies. Efficient taxation is 
essential for the creation of revenues, the efficiency of the taxation system 
can be judged by its tax buoyancy and elasticity i.e. the tax system of the 
country and its ability to mobilize the tax revenue, according to demand and 
supply. The debate of tax elasticity and buoyancy got much attention during 
the 1960s when IMF started to assist on an international level thus, lending 
based on the economic performance of the countries. Tax elasticity refers to 
the measurement of responsiveness of the tax system with changes in the 
level of national income under different discretionary changes. Whereas, tax 
buoyancy measures the responsiveness of the tax revenue changes with the 
level of national income under changes of tax policy, rates, bases, and 
regulation (Lotz and Morss, 1967; Chelliah, 1971). Mitchell and Andrew 
(1991) mention that the precise information about elasticity and buoyancy 
provides the opportunity for the government to speculate revenues and 
expenditures under different economic situations. Moreover, with the help 
of tax elasticity and buoyancy policymakers conduct a comparative analysis 
of different economies’ budgeting, revenue, and expenditure structure. 
Following (Chelliah, 1971; Tanzi and Zee, 2000; Karagoz, 2013; Ali and 
Audi, 2018; Dudine and Jalles, 2018; Roussel et al., 2021), the functional 
form of the model become as: 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡)     (1) 
TR=Tax revenue components 
GDP=Gross Domestic Product (current $US) 
i= cross sections (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) 
t= time period (1990-2019)  
For checking the responsiveness of the dependent variable to the 
independent variable, the model can be written as:  𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡𝛼1𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑡    (2) 
where 
e is the base of the natural logarithm and u is the white noise error term. 
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Taking the log of both sides of eq.2.  
ln𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡   (3) 
Aggregate tax revenue, income tax, sales tax, customs duty, and excise duty 
are some of the main taxes in the selected sample countries. Balance panel 
data for four SAARC members’ countries i.e. Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, and India have been collected for the period from 1990 to 2019. We 
have used the data of all available years of SAARC nations, the reasons for 
using a long period, i.e. it provides the best linear unbiased estimator. The 
data has been taken from different sources e.g. Ministry of Finance of each 
country, and World Development Indicators (WDI) a database maintained 
by the World Bank.  
IV. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY  
This study has adopted the panel analysis method, which is considered an 
effective analytical method to handle econometric analysis. This study has 
used the balance panel data, which is the combination of cross-sectional and 
time-series data. The pooled OLS model has been applied for empirical 
analysis, it is also called the Common Constant Method (CCM). In this 
method, all the observations are pooled altogether and the regression model 
is run by neglecting the time-series and cross-sectional nature of the data. 
The method denies the individual and heterogeneity across the cross-
sectional and assumes that all the cross-sections are the same and there are a 
common constant and same coefficient for all the cross-sections. The 
estimated equation follows as:  ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?0+?̂?1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡     (4) 
Y=dependent variable 
X=independent variable 
t= time period (1990-2019) 
i=cross sections (Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and India) ?̂?0= common intercept  ?̂?0= common slope coefficient  𝑈𝑖𝑡= white noise error term 
In the pooled regression method, the level difference can be removed by 
mean centering the data across the observation by subtracting the mean of 
each group from the observation of each group. The model can be directly 
run by using the least-squares method. The pooled least squares method 
assumes that the independent variable should not be correlated with the error 
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term and should not depend upon the lagged values of the error term. The 
error term and should not depend upon the lagged value of the error term. 
The error terms should follow the normal distribution. The model should be 
correctly specified due to a specification error, error terms can be correlated 
with the independent variable which makes the results biased and 
inconsistent.  
Hausman (1978) proposes a test that is used to select the appropriate model 
between the fixed effects and random effect model. Following the equation 
of the Hausman specification the model can be used as follows: 𝐻 = (?̂?𝐹𝐸 − ?̂?𝑅𝐸)[(𝑉𝑎𝑟?̂?𝐹𝐸 − 𝑉𝑎𝑟?̂?𝑅𝐸)](?̂?𝐹𝐸 − ?̂?𝑅𝐸) ͠ 𝒳2(𝐾)   (5) 
The null hypothesis of this model is that the random effect model is 
appropriate and the alternative hypothesis is that the fixed effect model is 
appropriate.  
V. EMPIRICAL DISCUSSION  
This part of the paper is comprised of estimated results and discussion. This 
study has tried to measure the tax buoyancy and tax elasticity in the case of 
SAARC nations from 1990 to 2019. Different tax collections, i.e. excise 
duty, customs duty, sales tax, income tax, and total taxes are taken as the 
dependent variables separately along with the independent variable GDP. 
The estimated descriptive statistic has been given in table 1. These estimates 
show the normality, outliers, and other properties of the data. The results 
show that our variables have normally distributed data, with no outliers.        
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Means Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum Observations 
lnGDP 30.60021 1.115913 33.54126 26.47547 124 
Lnexdty 25.58774 2.027839 29.20326 20.03075 124 
Lncstdty 24.47557 1.041941 28.91606 22.51872 124 
Lnsaltax 26.86811 1.389275 30.35664 21.89175 124 
Lninctax 24.49511 1.349038 30.65447 22.01327 124 
Lntotax 26.97963 1.162816 29.85005 23.92672 124 
This study has used Breusch-Pagan LM, Pesaran scaled LM, Bias-corrected 
scaled LM, and Pesaran CD for checking the cross-section dependence of 
the variables. Based on estimated results the null of “no cross-sectional 
dependence” is rejected at a 1% level of significance. This situation is best 
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for applying the pooled least squares, moreover, the Hausman test would 
decide the random effect or fixed effect least squares.        
Table 2: Cross-Section Dependence Test 
Test ST ED CD IT TT GDP 
Breusch-Pagan LM 20455.5* 3873.8* 17845.3* 3873.8* 7300.8* 6761.1* 
Pesaran scaled LM 326.00* 37.616* 280.60* 37.616* 97.218* 87.83* 
Bias-corrected scaled LM 324.07* 35.683* 278.67* 35.683* 95.285* 85.898* 
Pesaran CD 140.34* 13.679* 130.04* 13.679* 16.764* 26.935* 
* for 1 percent level of significance: ST=Sales tax, ED=Excise Duty, CD=Custom Duty, 
IT=Income Tax, TT=Total Taxes, GDP=Gross Domestic Product 
 
This study has used balance panel data for empirical analysis in addition to 
the Hausman test which has been applied to check which method is more 
appropriate from the random effect model and the fixed effect model for 
further analysis. Moreover, the Hausman test decides which panel/pooled 
ordinary least squares method would be used for examining the 
responsiveness of dependent variables (different components of taxes) 
toward independent variables (GDP). Hausman's specification follows the 
chi-square distribution. The null hypothesis, i.e. the random effect model is 
appropriate, whereas the alternative hypothesis i.e. the fixed effect model is 
appropriate. In the first model, we have sales tax as the dependent variable 
and GDP as the independent variable. In the second model, we have an 
excise duty as the dependent variable and GDP as the independent variable. 
In the third model, we have customs duty as the dependent variable and GDP 
as the independent variable. In the fourth model, we have an income tax as a 
dependent variable and GDP as the independent variable. In the fifth model, 
we have a total tax as a dependent variable and GDP as the independent 
variable. The results of the Hausman test have been presented in table 3. The 
estimated results of the Hausman test show that the null hypothesis is 
accepted. Thus, we can conclude that the pooled random effect model is 









Hausman Specification Test: Sales Tax 
Chi- Square Stat P-value 
1.70 0.1919 
Hausman Specification Test: Excise Duty 
Chi- Square Stat P-value 
0.97 0.3242 
Hausman Specification Test: Customs Duty 
Chi- Square Stat P-value 
1.08 0.2241 
Hausman Specification Test: Income Tax 
Chi- Square Stat P-value 
0.03 0.8724 
Hausman Specification Test: Total Tax 
Chi- Square Stat P-value 
2.32 0.1274 
The results of pooled regression have been presented in table 4. The 
buoyancy coefficient for sales tax is statistically significant and has a value 
greater than 1 i.e. 1.31. The estimated results show that for every 1 percent 
increase in GDP, a 1.31 percent increase has occurred in sales tax, this 
indicates that sales tax is buoyant during the selected period. These findings 
are consistent with Tanzi and Zee (2000), Upender (2008), and Lagravinese 
et al., (2020). The value of the coefficient shows that sales tax is a good 
automatic stabilizer. Sales tax is the major source of revenue and helps the 
government to make expenditures and financing. Moreover, sales tax is easy 
to collect and its amount ensures the financial position of the economy and 
government therefore, it must be monitored regularly. Recent sales tax 
reforms in Pakistan and India bring a substantial rise in tax collection. The 
high buoyancy of sales tax indicates that these taxes are major contributors 
towards the revenue collection in SAARC nations. 
The results show that excise duty has a positive and significant relationship 
with GDP, but the coefficient is less than 1. These findings are consistent 
with Wolswijk (2009), Hamlet (2013), and Lagravinese et al., (2020). The 
estimates show that a 1 percent increase in GDP, causes the excise duty to 
rise by 0.81 percent. The results explain that excise duty is not an automatic 
stabilizer, as it has a buoyancy coefficient less than 1, for a good stabilizer 
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coefficient must be equal to or greater than 1. Although there is a positive 
and significant relationship between GDP and excise duty, it is non-
proportional. Governments feel rigid in the adoption process of excise duty 
as revenue collection. Several international institutions discourage the rise 
of excise duty. So, low excise tax rates, leakages, and less efficient excise 
bodies in SAARC nations make the excise duty of a less buoyant nature as 
revenue collection.  
The results show that GDP has a positive and significant relationship with 
customs duty, the outcomes show that a 1 percent increase in GDP brings a 
0.62 percent increase in custom duty collections. These findings are 
consistent with Timsina (2007), Karagoz (2013), Hamlet (2013), and 
Lagravinese et al., (2020). The estimates show that customs duty has less 
buoyancy coefficient, it is less than 1, this means that customs duty is not a 
good automatic stabilizer. The less buoyancy or non-buoyancy of customs 
duty indicates that despite any rise in imports in SAARC nations, the tax 
collection from customs duty is not the best source of revenue in these 
countries. There are several reasons for the non - buoyancy of customs duty, 
i.e. rely on direct taxes, trade liberalization, globalization, fewer exports, and 
structural adjustment of SAARC nations. But still, there is room to enhance 
the revenue collection through customs duty by rationalizing the tariff 
structure and modernizing the rules and regulations of customs duty.   
Income tax is one of the main sources of the government’s revenue; the 
government directly charges the income tax from individuals, firms, and 
businesses based on income and profits. The estimated results show that 
GDP has a positive and significant impact on income tax, the outcomes show 
that a 1 percent increase in GDP, a 1.12 percent increase has occurred in 
income tax collection in the case of SAARC nations. These findings are 
consistent with Tanzi and Zee (2000), Belinga et al. (2014), Dudine and 
Jalles (2018), and Lagravinese et al. (2020). The results reveal that income 
tax is highly buoyant, as the estimated coefficient is higher than 1. This 
shows that income tax changes are proportional to changes in GDP in 
addition to being a good automatic stabilizer. The collection of income tax 
in SAARC nations has been increased during the last decade due to the 
improvement of reforms in taxation structure and progressive taxation 
system. Moreover, high buoyancy is attached with structural reforms of 
taxation and a broad tax net.    
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Total tax revenue is the sum of all direct and indirect taxes collected by the 
government. The results show that GDP has a positive and significant 
relationship with total taxes in SAARC nations. The outcomes reveal that a 
1 percent increase in GDP brings a 1.02 percent increase in total taxes. This 
reveals that total taxes in SAARC nations are highly buoyant as coefficient 
value is greater than 1 in addition to being a good automatic stabilizer. The 
high buoyancy of total taxes shows that selected nations have improved their 
taxation system and focus on a progressive taxation system. 
Table 4: Pooled Ordinary Least Square Outcomes 
Explained Variable: Sales Tax 
Explanatory Variable Coefficient Std. Error Z-stat P-value 
GDP 1.305411 0.0293386 44.49 0.000 
Constant -12.77234 0.8762604 -14.58 0.000 
Dependent variable: Excise Duty 
GDP 0.8109319 0.0649817 12.48 0.000 
Constant 0.5837339 2.087248 0.28 0.780 
Dependent variable: Customs Duty 
GDP 0.6158462 0.1377411 4.47 0.021 
Constant 7.246391 4.077166 1.78 0.174 
Dependent variable: Income Tax 
GDP 1.124341 0.0589846 19.06 0.000 
Constant -7.78561 1.749564 -4.45 0.000 
Dependent variable: Total Taxes 
GDP 1.019747 0.031845 32.02 0.000 
Constant -3.205078 0.9435714 -3.40 0.000 
VI. CONCLUSIONS  
This article has analyzed the tax buoyancy of selected SAARC nations 
(Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) from 1990 to 2019. Based on 
the outcomes of the random effect model, the pooled least squares method 
has been applied for the estimation of coefficients. The buoyancy of four 
components of taxes and total taxes has been analyzed by using GDP as an 
explanatory variable. The outcomes show that income tax and sales tax have 
high buoyancy and are considered the main pillars of government revenues, 
both income tax and sales tax seem to be an automatic stabilizer and directly 
proportional to the gross domestic product in SAARC nations. Although 
custom duty and excise duty have a significant relationship with the gross 
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domestic product with low buoyancy, it indicates that custom duty and 
excise duty are not automatically stabilized and non-proportional to the gross 
domestic product in the case of SAARC nations. This also highlights that 
structural reforms of income tax and sales are improved in these countries 
because these are internally decided, whereas excise duty and customs duty 
are imposed by following the instructions of IFM, World Bank, and WTO. 
The outcomes of the study suggest that although income tax is the biggest 
source of revenue, there is still room for more revenue i.e. agricultural 
income which is not taxed, whereas it is a big source of GDP in SAARC 
nations. There are several unnecessary exemptions and amnesty schemes 
that need to be abolished for increasing the share of taxes to GDP. Some 
structural changes must be performed i.e. tax administration should control 
leakages of tax evasion and broaden the tax bases, which in turn would make 
the income tax more responsive. Customs duty and excise duty are the major 
sources of revenue in many countries. Excise duty is buoyant due to 
restrictions imposed by WTO and IMF, but the developing countries e.g. 
SAARC nations can adopt ad-valorem tax rather than the specific tax rate 
for increasing tax revenues. Customs duty valuation should be improved, 
over-invoicing and under-invoicing should be discouraged, the wrong 
declaration of imported goods should be penalized, miss-utilization of pass-
book facilities at custom points should be checked regularly, use of duplicate 
documents should also be checked, and the activities of the customs 
patrolling group should be enhanced. These are the major measures that 
should be taken to increase the customs duty as a revenue collection tool. 
The overall taxation system of SAARC nations is an automatic stabilizer but 
there is a dire need to check and balance between revenues and expenditures, 
the leakages in the taxation system should be controlled, the efficiency of the 
tax collection bodies should be enhanced and unnecessary exemptions 
should be withdrawn. 
VII. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
This study has used four major SAARC nations for empirical analysis, due 
to the unavailability of data of other member nations. The outcomes of the 
study can be improved by managing the data of all SAARC nations. A cross-
regional analysis can also provide better policy options to enhance tax 
revenues. This study is using the only GDP as an explanatory variable to 
measure the tax buoyancy. By including other determinants of tax revenues, 
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the outcomes of the study can be improved. This study is only focusing on 
macro foundations, whereas micro-level analysis has been ignored. Thus, by 
studying the micro foundation, the tax system of SAARC nations can be 
improved.  
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